Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for

your leadership of this Committee. We are all going to be sad to

see you go.

The President is right that the most important thing is keeping

nuclear weapons out of the worst hands. Aside from deposing a

leader who merely fantasized about nuclear weapons, this Administration

over the last 6 years has done little. The only enemy we

have that has nuclear weapons is North Korea, and they have got

a lot more now than they had 6 years ago. We need maximum carrots,

maximum sticks and maximum focus.

As the maximum carrots, we ought to be offering the North Korean

Government what they asked for, a nonaggression pact, if

they eliminate verifiably forever their nuclear weapons. Yet, as Mr.

Lantos points out, there are those hardliners with a veto in the Administration

that prevent that from happening, not to mention that

nonaggression pacts are a bit of a bureaucratic bugaboo with

some—in other parts of our Government. We ought to be willing to

tell Pyongyang if they do not have nuclear weapons we will not invade.

Second, we need maximum sticks. That can only mean changing

the behavior of China and South Korea. Yet South Korea has disappointed

us, and our response is to propose a Free Trade Agreement.

That is carrots for them continuing to disappoint us in how

they treat North Korea.

And as to China, we have made it very clear that our markets

will remain wide open to them without the slightest hint of any

problem, even if they continue to do what they think is in their

best interest with regard to North Korea. So we have limited our

actions in China to trying to persuade them that we are smart,

that they are dumb, that they don’t understand what is in their interest

and if they would only listen to us, they would change their

policies.

Obviously, to change China’s policy, we would have to change our

policy. To change their policy on North Korea, we have to hint

slightly and diplomatically—far more diplomatically than I am capable

of being at this time—that their trade relationship is dependent

upon how they deal with the greatest threat in their region of

the world to the safety of Americans that is the North Korean nuclear

program.

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Burns how in the last

2 years of this Administration we are going to somehow be successful while continuing the same policies of no linkage and no nonaggression

pact, but perhaps I will be wrong and perhaps you will

be successful.

I yield back.

Thank you.

First I would like to add some additional praise to Mr. Leach. I

didn’t hear all of his comments, but I have heard him for 10 years

now, and I am quite disappointed that I won’t continue to hear him

at least in the exact same capacity. I think that Congress will benefit

from his wisdom no matter how he chooses to express it.

Mr. Secretary, North Korea has demonstrated that it is willing

to endure significant pain in order to have nuclear weapons, and

it will continue down this path as long as it retains at least some

significant economic aid and at least some diplomatic support from

China. So the key is China.

The facts on the ground observable from Beijing are that they

don’t want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, but they put a

greater emphasis on preventing North Korea from imploding.

When Beijing looks toward the United States, it sees facts on the

ground as well, namely, the United States will not link China’s activity

toward North Korea in even the tiniest way toward our trade

policy toward China, and the United States won’t sign a nonaggression

pact with North Korea, though we will author a personal

promise from an individual who will continue to guide our affairs

for 26 months.

And so they look at the facts on the ground, and they have decided

to adopt the policy that they have adopted, which has been

favorable enough toward North Korea for North Korea to continue

its program. Now we send Secretary Hill to Beijing to try to convince

China that they misunderstand the facts on the ground or

have miscalculated their own national interests. And we all pray

that at some point, Beijing will recognize Secretary Hill’s brilliance

and change their policy, even though there are no changes in the

facts.

I have tremendous faith in the power of prayer, but perhaps we

ought to consider changing the facts that are observable from Beijing

in order to get Beijing to change its policies. We could change

the facts in a number of ways. We could have some tiny aspect of

our trade relationship or of the general atmospherics of the trade

relationship dependent on China’s behavior toward North Korea.

We could offer a nonaggression fact toward the North Koreans.

We could promise China that our troops will never go north of the

38th Parallel, even if North Korea implodes, or we could even offer

China that we would withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, should

that peninsula ever be unified under a single government. We

could probably do some other things as well. We could, in effect,

change the facts observable from Beijing.

And so believe it or not, I do have a question, and that is: Are

we going to change the facts observable from Beijing, or will we

continue to simply show China or try to show China that they

haven’t understood the facts or haven’t really calculated correctly

what is in their own national interests, given the facts that they

can observe?

I comment that the one fact that has been

changed on the ground was changed by Kim Jong-il, when he tested,

and that that has caused a change in fact, did cause China’s

behavior. China’s behavior, though, is not yet optimal. And I think

our success depends upon persuading China to adopt an optimal

behavior, and also offering carrots that we can offer. We need more

carrots. We are capable of providing the carrots, but only China

can provide the sticks, that is to say, adverse changes in the status

quo to the North Koreans.

So I will continue to pray that China will reach optimal policies

without us doing anything to change the facts, that Kim Jong-il’s

change of the facts will be sufficient, and at the same time I will

continue to urge you, just in case my prayers are not fully heard,

to do everything possible to change the facts that the Chinese can

observe both our policy toward China and our willingness to provide

carrots to North Korea.

And I yield back.

Mr. Secretary, if I could amend my question, I

should have recognized that, China has taken a step forward. The

premise of my question is that they haven’t taken enough steps so

as to change North Korean behavior. Now I may be wrong on that

assumption, but I at least ought to state it.